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"LANGUAGE-QUALIFYING" JURIES TO EXCLUDE
BILINGUAL SPEAKERS*
MarinaHsieht

INTRODUCTION

When I was asked to participate in this conference I
accepted-despite the fact that I am not a "regular" in the
family of jury scholars-because I could not resist the
invitation to share with the social science community a "wish
list" of issues needing more empirical research. As I considered
the subject of the selection and nullification of juries, I
immediately thought of Hernandez v. New York, 1 in which the
Supreme Court allowed disqualification of Spanish-speaking
jurors for cause, despite the potential equal protection concerns
suggested by Batson v. Kentucky.2 Hernandez has bothered me
for quite a while, not only because of its questionable
constitutional conclusions, but also because of what it implies
about the attitude the law takes toward multilingualism in our
courts. This Essay proposes that we reframe one of the
02001 Marina Hsieh. All Rights Reserved. This paper was presented at a
plenary panel on The Law's Quest for Impartiality: Juror Selection and Juror

Nullification, at "The Jury in the Twenty-First Century- An Interdisciplinary
Conference," Brooklyn Law School, New York, Oct. 6, 2000. The title is an intentional
allusion to the creation of "death-qualifying" juries by striking from service in capital

cases potential jurors who oppose the death penalty in all cases. See, e.g., Witherspoon
v. State of Ill., 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. A.B.,
1982, Harvard University;, J.D., 1988, University of California, Berkeley. Thanks to
Douglas Colbert, Susan Herman, Nancy Marder, and the Honorable Louis H. Pollak
for patient listening and for thoughtful comments, and to Rudhir Patel for research

assistance.
1 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
2 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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evidentiary premises on which disqualification of bilingual
jurors 3 is currently justified by post-Hernandez courts. In
addition, because we lack data on virtually every aspect of the
needs of bilingual participants in our court system, this Essay
identifies some issues for additional research about bilingual

jurors.
I.

THE CHALLENGE OF BILINGUALISM IN COURTS

The phenomenon of bilingual courtrooms is clearly
upon us, to varying degrees and in varying forms, depending on
the region of the country. One in seven Americans over the age
of five does not use English at home, and of that number, fortyfour percent-almost fourteen million people-speak English
less than "very well." This number had grown by sixty-four
percent for Spanish speakers over the previous decade, and by
over 100 percent for various Asian and Pacific Islander groups.'
For the sake of simplicity, I will use the term "bilingual" in this paper to
refer to a juror proficient in both English and a non-English language in which original
testimony will be given. In some instances, additional foreign languages may be
spoken, but the same analysis applies to bilingual or multilingual jurors who might
understand any original testimony.
4 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Language Use and English Ability, Persons 5
Years and Over, by State: 1990 Census of Population, at CPHL-96 (1990), availableat
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/language/tablel.txt (last visited Mar. 30,
2001). 4,826,958 people over age five answered that they speak English "not well"
and 1,845,243 answered "not at all." Id. Over half of those speak Spanish as
their primary language, but there are also over a million speakers each of
French, German, Italian, and Chinese, thousands of whom speak English less
than well. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Detailed Languages Spoken at Home and Ability
to Speak English for Persons 5 Years and Over-50 Languages with GreatestNumber
of Speakers: 1990 Census of Population, at CPHL-133 (1990), available at
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/language/table5.txt (last visited Mar. 30,
2001).
In the decade between 1980 and 1990, these numbers had grown 64% for
Spanish, 99.5% for Chinese, 138.6% for Korean, and 94.7% for Vietnamese speakers.
Cf. id. with U.S. Bureau of Census, Characteristics of the Population, Detailed
Population Characteristics:1980 Census of the Population, vol. 1, ch. D, Part 1, at Tbl.
256 (1980).
Preliminary figures from the 2000 U.S. Census estimate the Hispanic
population increased 57% from 1990 to 2000 and the Asian population by 40%, while
the overall U.S. population grew only 13%. Cf U.S. Dept. of Commerce, General
PopulationCharacteristics:1990 Census of the Population, at CP-1-1, at 3 (Tbl. 3: Race
and Hispanic Origin), available at httpj/www.census.gov/prod/cenl990/cpl/cp-l-l.pdf
(last visited Apr. 18, 2001), with Elizabeth M. Grieco & Rachel C. Cassidy, Census
2000 Brief: Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin, at 3 & 9 (Tbls. 1 & 7) (Mar. 2001),
3
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Language interpreters were used in the federal court system
190,127 times last year, almost three times as often as a
decade ago.6 Clearly, to provide meaningful access to justice,
many court proceedings require interpretation of multiple
languages in order to be comprehensible to all of the
participants including defendants, parties, judges, and juries!
This Essay focuses on how multilingual proceedings impose
special limitations on jurors with bilingual skills.
There are already great pressures on the average
foreign language speaker in the court system. This Essay does
not address the ongoing practice of disqualifying jurors for lack
of English proficiency, other than to note that insufficient
command of English exacerbates the already disproportionate
disqualification of immigrants and racial and ethnic minorities
due to lack of citizenship.8 It is thus particularly ironic that
these already underrepresented populations are further barred

available at http:J/www.census.gov/prod/2001pubsfc2kbr01-1.pdf (last visited Apr. 18,
2001).
, Interpreters were used in 190,127 events in federal court in the fiscal year
ending September 30, 2000, compared to 66,644 events in calendar year 1990.
Telephone interview with Richard Carelli, Senior Public Affairs Specialist, The
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (Feb. 16, 2001) (unpublished data from the
District Court Administration Division).
Of course, minimal access often falls far short of actual equality of
treatment. Impediments to full communication, the burdens of translation services,
bias, and cultural gaps create a variety of disadvantages to defendants, witnesses, and
jurors who lack English proficiency. See Judge Paul J. DeMuniz, Introduction to
IMMIGRANTS IN COuRTS 3, 4-6 (Joanne I. Moore ed., 1999); Miguel A. Mendez, Lawyers,
Linguistics,Story-Tellers, and Limited English Speaking Witnesses, 27 N.M. L. REV.
77, 79-87 (1997) (linguistic issues in courtroom presentations and English-language
assessments); Michael B. Shulman, Note, No Hablo Inglis: Court Interpretationas a
Major Obstacle to Fairnessfor Non-English Speaking Defendants, 46 VAND. L. REV.
175 (1993) (addressing obstacles to competent and unbiased interpretation services);
Report of the Oregon Supreme Court Task Force on Racial/Ethnic Issues in the
JudicialSystem, 73 OR. L. REV. 823, 835 (1994) [hereinafter Oregon Report] ("Many
who came before us said that, because of cultural and language differences, they did
not receive justice. The best they could hope for, they said, was to experience the
process ofjustice even though it was unexplained and unintelligible.").
a See 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(1)-(3) (2000) (stating qualifications for jury service).
Non-citizenship and insufficient English exclude an estimated 37.5% of California's
Latino/a population from jury service. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 203(a)(1),(a)(6)
(West 1999) (listing exceptions to persons qualified to be trial jurors); 1997 Final
Report of the California Judicial Council Advisory Committee on Racial and Ethnic
Bias in the Courts at 196 (1997). In Puerto Rico, the United States Federal court
requires English proficiency, but has allowed voir dire to be conducted in Spanish.
United States v. Flores-Rivera, 56 F.3d 319, 326 n.4 (1st Cir. 1995).
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from juries because the law condones disqualification of not
only the juror who is deficient in English, but, under certain
circumstances, exclusion of the juror who is proficient in
English and another language.
That juror was the subject of the 1991 Supreme Court
case, Hernandez v. New York, in which a prosecutor struck two
Spanish-surnamed, bilingual jurors solely because of the
state's concern that they might not listen to, follow, and accept
the Spanish-to-English interpreter as the final arbiter of the
testimony of Spanish-speaking witnesses.9 A plurality of the
Court held that the equal protection guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Latino defendant were not
violated by allowing strikes for this reason, despite the
predictable disproportionate effect on minority and ethnic
jurors." Circuit courts have followed Hernandez on the facts of
similar cases, accepting an ability to understand original, nonEnglish testimony of a witness as a legitimate, non-race-based
reason for a peremptory strike of a juror."
0 500 U.S. 352 (1991). The prosecutor stated:
[Mly reason for rejecting . . . these two jurors . . . . is I feel very
uncertain that they would be able to listen and follow the interpreter
...
I believe that in their heart they will try to follow it, but I felt
there was a great deal of uncertainty as to whether they could accept
the interpreter as the final arbiter of what was said by each of the
witnesses, especially where there were going to be Spanish-speaking
witnesses, and I didn't feel, when I asked them whether or not they
could accept the interpreter's translation of it, I didn't feel that they
could. They each looked away from me and said with some hesitancy
that they would try, not that they could, but that they would try to
follow the interpreter, and I feel that in a case where the interpreter
will be for the main witnesses, they would have an undue impact upon
the jury.
Id. at 356-57 (citing App. at 3-4).
"' The four-Justice plurality opinion by Justice Kennedy rejected foreignlanguage ability as a per se pretext for ethnicity or the cause in this case, although it
allowed for the possibility that "a policy of striking all who speak a given language,
without regard to the particular circumstances of the trial or the individual responses
of the jurors, may be found by the trial judge to be a pretext for racial discrimination."
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 371-72. However, the concurring opinion of Justice O'Connor,
joined by Justice Scalia, took a much narrower view of defendants' potential
constitutional challenges, sharply distinguishing "disproportionate effect, which is not
sufficient to constitute an equal protection violation, and intentional discrimination,
which is." Id. at 375 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
" See, e.g., Pemberthy v. Beyer, 19 F.3d 857 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S.
969 (1994); United States v. Munoz, 15 F.3d 395 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1134
(1994).
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This Essay will not revisit these constitutional issues,
which many others have already explored, or explore other
issues of (un)fairness to defendants and non-English-speaking
witnesses. 2 Instead, this Essay will focus on selection and
disqualification of jurors, specifically, jurors who are fluent in a
non-English language that will be used in original testimony. I
conclude that the practice of disregarding original non-English
testimony that is endorsed in the Hernandez line of cases
interferes with the truth-seeking goals of our courts, and
undermines the function of the juror.
II.

THE PERILS OF INTERPRETED TESTIMONY

The relevance of a juror's ability to understand
original non-English testimony stems from the relative values
assigned to the original non-English testimony of a witness or
party, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the
interpreter's English rendition of that raw testimony. Ideally,
these would be equivalent; the interpreter in a courtroom could
listen to the raw testimony and provide an invisible, exact
conversion of its meaning into English. In this model,
interpreters are courtroom personnel who exercise expert
skills, but do not act as experts; they do not add content or
meaning, but are merely the neutral device by which another
language is processed into English. The court interpreter is
like a second court reporter, who is present, but not center
stage, simply processing the content presented by witnesses
without alteration or addition or distraction. Just as the court
reporter's transcript is the official record of the words spoken
in court, not the actual words themselves," the court
12

See, e.g., Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Language and Culture (Not to Say Race)

of Peremptory Challenges, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 21 (1993) (describing Hernandez as
a dilution of the line of Batson protections); Alfredo Mirande, "Now that I Speak
English, No Me Dejan Hablar [Tm Not Allowed to Speak'I" The Implications of
Hernandez v. New York, 18 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 115 (1996) (arguing that
Hernandez is racial discrimination and counter to linguistic research and experience of
bilingual speakers); Joel H. Swift, The UnconventionalEqual Protection Jurisprudence
of Jury Selection, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 295 (1996) (describing Hernandez as a retreat
by the Court from a preference for the Equal Protection Clause to a preference for the
peremptory challenge).
13 28 U.S.C. § 753(b) (2000) ("No transcripts
of the proceedings of the court
shall be considered as official except those made from the records certified by the
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interpreter's English version of the testimony is the basis of the
reporter's transcript, not the original non-English testimony.
Thus, for official purposes, the original testimony ultimately
has zero presence in the record, being entirely supplanted by
the English interpretation.
This complete shift of the basis of the record from the
original to the interpreted testimony puts tremendous pressure
on the accuracy of the interpretation. This "interpretation" of a
foreign language into English is far more significant than the
"translation" made by the court reporter from oral to written
testimony in English because the jurors themselves are not
able or even allowed to evaluate the raw testimony as
originally spoken by the witness. The fidelity of the officially
accepted interpretation is unverifiable for at least two reasons:
(1) because a juror not fluent in the language of the original
testimony is unable to comprehend the original testimony, she
cannot compare it to the oral English interpretation or the
written English transcript, and (2) when a juror is instructed
to consider only the official English interpretation, in principle
she is not allowed to even listen to, much less comprehend, the
meaning of the original non-English testimony. In contrast,
although the written transcript of the court reporter takes
precedence over the oral testimony for the purpose of the
official record, jurors are routinely expected to consider and
make their judgments on the original oral testimony as they
heard it; the recording is often never provided or read back to
them.
A threshold issue in proving adequate interpretation
services is the problem of supply. Although we need far more
systematic data in this area,14 it appears that the system is not
meeting the ever-increasing demand for sufficiently trained
court interpreters. There are vast differences in the
requirements and resources of federal and state courts, urban
reporter or other individual designated to produce the record.").
14 The National Association of Judiciary Interpreters and Translators has
noted, "The collection and reporting of reliable statistics regarding interpreter usage is
essential to the management of court interpreting services. Unfortunately, it is also a
huge problem, because methods of defining and counting interpreter cases vary from
court to court, and in some instances the record-keeping is sloppy or nonexistent."
National Association of Judiciary Interpreters and Translators website, FAQs, at
httpJ/www.najit.org/faq.html#q5 (last visited Mar. 30, 2001).
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and rural areas, and criminal and civil trials. At the federal
level, the Court Interpreters Act limits interpretive services to
in-court proceedings in criminal cases or in civil matters
brought by the United States." Even under this narrow
requirement, the federal courts last year required interpreters
for seventy-seven different languages.16 The proficiency of these
interpreters surely varies. To date, the Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts has developed certifications in only three
languages, Spanish, Navaho, and Haitian Creole, although the
Court Interpreters Act was passed in 1978."7
The regulation and certification of state interpreters is
even more haphazard. As of 1999, only seventeen states tested
the translation abilities of court interpreters in any language;
only nineteen states had some system of certifying
interpreters, and even those did not certify many commonly
used languages." Funding requirements for training,
certification, and services are significant, and the resources
have not kept pace with the increased need. For example, in
California the number of interpreters dropped thirty-nine
percent in the second half of the 1990s, a fact that the Bay
Area Court Interpreters Association attributes to a decade of
low and stagnant compensation levels. 9 This problem is even
greater for smaller states and localities. Absent adequate
ranks of trained, certified interpreters, it is not surprising that
studies of state courts reveal an almost random recruitment
iC

28 U.S.C. §§ 1827(a), 1828(a) (2000).
See Telephone interview with Richard Carelli, supra note 6. The

overwhelming majority of interpretations were from Spanish (179,271 events), followed
by Mandarin (2,092), Vietnamese (931), Cantonese, Russian, Korean, and Arabic. Id.
17 Michael S. Arnold, Lawyers Say Justice Lost in Translation:Many
Court
InterpretersCalled Inaccurate,THE WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 1993, at M1 (reporting that
96% of applicants fail the written or oral examinations; by 1993 only 440 Spanishlanguage interpreters had been certified under that program).
Joanne I. Moore & Judge Ron A. Mamiya, Interpreters in Court
Proceedings,in IMI1GRANTS IN COURTS, supra note 7, at 30-31.
'9 See Davis Cuts Court Interpreter Funds, ASIAN WEEK, July 8, 1999, at 10.
As of January 2000, the federal courts pay $305 per day to per diem interpreters; for
nine years before that the per diem was $250 per day. National Association of
Judiciary Interpreters and Translators website, FAQs, question 14, supra note 14 ("In
some parts of the United States the pay is dismal; in others it is more reasonable.")
The maximum reimbursement for court interpreters in Mississippi was $5 per day
until 2000 when a new state law allowed " 'reasonable' fees, but most local
governments don't have the money." New Law Raises Fees for Court Interpreters,
ASIAN WEEK, Oct. 12, 2000, at 6.
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process, with no uniform inquiry by judges into the
impartiality or competence of interpreters. As one researcher
summed up:
The use of not only bailiffs, secretaries, building janitors, courthouse
personnel, jurors, arresting officers, probation officers, prison
guards, civil plaintiffs, district attorneys and other counsel,
prosecution witnesses, young children, friends and relatives of
victims or witnesses, prison inmates, and defendants and
codefendants has been documented.'

With such disparate levels of training and
certification, we must question the accuracy of much courtroom
interpretation. The answer is difficult to quantify. Lack of
empirical data on the quality of interpretation in various court
settings is exacerbated by the absence of systematic recording
or preservation of original foreign-language testimony for later
comparison. 21 A study in the District of Columbia Circuit
reported that out of attorneys who had tried a case in a District
of Columbia federal court involving testimony of a non-English
speaker, sixteen percent of White, nineteen percent of AfricanAmerican, and twenty-five percent of Latino/a attorneys
thought the interpretation was less than adequate. 2 Additional
anecdotal evidence from judges, lawyers, law clerks, news
reporters observing court sessions, auditors for court
administrations, and the examinations of interpreters who had
already regularly served in the courts illustrate the magnitude
of some errors. For example:

"' Alice J. Baker, A Model Statute to Provide Foreign-LanguageInterpreters
in the Ohio Courts, 30 U. TOL. L. REv. 593, 603-04 & nn.62-76 (1999).
21 Even in federal court, electronic sound recordings of interpreted portions of
judicial proceedings are not required, with the exception of grand jury proceedings on
motion of the accused. 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(2) (2000) (allowing judicial discretion
whether to require sound recordings).
22 Report of the Special Committee on Race and Ethnicity to the D.C. Circuit
Task Force on Gender, Race, and Ethnic Bias, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 189, 296 (1996)
[hereinafter D.C. CircuitTask Force].
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The witness says:
"Someone began to push me with a
black tow truck. Later, he began to
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The interpretersays:
"Someone began to honk at me, and I
moved. "u

move me."

I don't even have "ten cents."
"shoot"
I was going to "chat with" the victim.
I pronounce you husband and wife.
"Do you remember the day
[defendant] sexually assaulted you?"
Defense attorney (in English): "Did
the robber have facial hair?"

I don't even have "ten kilos."2
"kill"2
I was going to "kill" the victim.2G
Now you are huntedY
"Do you remember the day
[defendant] made love to you? "'
Hmong Interpreter to witness: "Was
his hair long?"

Witness (in Hmong): "Same length as
mine."
"as for the Vietnamese, I never
associate with them"

English interpreter to court: "The hair
the same. "29
"no" °

Moore & Mamiya, supra note 18, at 29-30 (from a candidate's answer on a
consecutive interpreting section of the Washington State court interpreter certification
exam; although the candidate failed the test, this person had already interpreted for
hundreds of misdemeanor and felony cases).
24 Alain Sanders, Libertad and Justicia for All, TIME, May 29, 1989, at 65,
analyzed in Shulman, supranote 7, at 176 & nn.1-5.
Moore & Mamiya, supra note 18, at 39 (citing Ken Kolker, Trial and
Errors, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Feb. 21, 1993, reporting on a 1992-93 audit of the
Michigan courts by the press).
2' D.C. Circuit Task Force, supra note 22, at 297-98 (fortunately, an audiotape record of the defendant's statement had been made in this Superior Court case).
Ruth Hammond, Lost in Translation for Immigrants in Court, Bad
InterpretersRig the Jury, THE WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 1993, at C3.
2 Id. In this St. Paul case, the reporter reviewed audiotapes of a rape trial in

which the accusers, married women, spoke only Hmong. The two defendants claimed
that the sex was consensual, but that the community had pressured the women to have
the defendants punished as severely as such adultery would have been punished in
Laos. Hammond pointed out that "[clomplicating the interpretation was a widespread
belief in the Hmong community that the English word 'rape' is an appropriate cultural
translation for acts that violate the Hmong sexual code, such as having consensual sex
with a married woman." Id. Beyond this subtlety, Hammond further observed that
"nearly a third of the question-and-answer exchanges conducted in English-Hmong
were so altered by interpreters that jurors were substantially mislead about what the
witnesses' actual testimony was ....[A] correct interpretation of an exchange seldom
occurred." Id.
Miranda Ewell, At the Mercy of Others' Voices, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,
Dec. 17, 1989, at 17A. In this case, the press exposed errors by hiring their own
interpreters to observe proceedings. The defendant was hampered by dual
interpretations: most of the testimony was in Hmong, interpreted into English for the
court and jury, and then reinterpreted into Vietnamese for the defendant.
30 Id.
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Even the most fully trained and skillful interpreters
incorporate ambiguities in interpretation because language
and interpretation.
inherently involves understanding
Consider how an English-speaking juror must listen and then
assign meaning to every phrase of original English testimony
she hears. We select our appropriate meanings based not only
on rules of grammar and usage, but also on an experiencelinked knowledge of how to interpret English sensibly in a
particular context. Lawrence M. Solan, among others, has
written about the assistance that linguistic experts can bring
to even all-English cases. 31 They can help identify and explain
how English speakers assign appropriate interpretations to
statutory and other language within a range of possible
meanings.
Inherent ambiguities will persist, in some cases, with
or without expert assistance. For example, recall the case of
Derek Bentley in Great Britain. A mildly retarded nineteenyear old, he was already in the custody of London police for
breaking into a warehouse when his sixteen-year old cooffender, who had a gun, confronted an officer. Bentley
shouted, "Let him have it," and his friend shot and killed the
officer. Bentley was convicted of murder on a theory of
constructive malice, and hanged in 1953. His culpability was
consistent with an interpretation of his last statement as an
incitement to the trigger man to shoot the officer, but would be
unsupported if his last words were an appeal for his friend to
hand his weapon over to the police.32 How should an interpreter
interpret, and therefore translate,the word "it"-as a "gunshot"
or as "the gun"?
These inherent ambiguities of interpretation make
formal training and certification all the more necessary. Mere
fluency plus some specialized vocabulary study is insufficient.
For example, a simple, unintentional decision to include or
omit polite forms of address, such as not translating "Sefior"
into "Sir" and omitting the introductory formality, can have a
31 See Lawrence M. Solan, Can the Legal System Use Experts on Meaning?, 66

TENN. L. REV. 1167 (1999).
32 See Joseph L. Hoffmann, On the Perilsof Line-Drawing:Juveniles and the
Death Penalty, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 229, 245-46 (1989); Christopher J. Meade, Reading
DeathSentences: The NarrativeConstruction of CapitalPunishment, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV.
732, 754 n.120 (1996).
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tremendous impact on the jurors' impression of a witness'
testimony 3 When bilingual reporter Ruth Hammond
personally reviewed tapes and transcripts of a St. Paul,
Minnesota rape trial involving key testimony in Hmong, she
observed,
At times, the interpreters usurped the role of the witness, providing
explanations that had not been offered in Hmong, or changing
details to conform with other witnesses' testimony. At other times,
they usurped the roles of the prosecuting and defense attorneys,
independently asking questions the attorneys had never posed in
order to help the witness formulate a more detailed response. They
also usurped the role of the judge when they struck answers they
apparently deemed nonresponsive by not interpreting them. None of
this was apparent to the lawyers, the judge or the jury, of course; nor
does any of it appear in the trial transcripts.34

This interpretive function is probably the root of the frequent
overuse of the word "kill" for lesser words like "chat" or "shoot."
However unconscious or well-intentioned, an interpreter
always intervenes between the original testimony and the
jurors' inferences.35

See, e.g., SUSAN BERK-SELIGSON, THE BILINGUAL COURTROOM: COURT
INTERPRETERS IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 158-69 (1990). Interpreters have the power to

change the impact of a non-English speaking witness through use of politeness,
hedging, and informality. In Seligson's study, 551 mock jurors, divided into two groups,
heard tape recordings of a single Spanish speaking witness. Both groups heard the
same accurate English interpretation, with one difference: in one group the interpreter
would translate polite forms of address, for example, "yes, sir" when the witness said
"si, Sefior," while the other group's interpreter would simply say "yes." The jurors in
the second group rated the witness less convincing, less competent, less intelligent, and
less trustworthy than did jurors in the first group who heard the interpreter's
politeness markers. The differences were statistically significant: less than a 0.1%
chance that they were due to chance. Id at 161-62. The 217 Hispanic jurors in the two
groups (97% of whom spoke Spanish) found the witness equally convincing and
trustworthy in both interpretations, although those who heard the "polite"
interpretation rated the witness more competent and trustworthy. Id. at 163.
:1

Hammond, supranote 27, at C3.

35 Reid Hastie provided an example of how jurors must construct a story line
out of disparate bits of English testimony by many witnesses. See Reid Hastie,
Emotions in Jurors'Decisions, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 991 (2001). As testimony keeps
accumulating, the conscientious interpreter might well say something like, "The
pregnant woman went to weld the rusty beam in the house that was crushed by the
rock." That might put it all together for a jury, but clearly adds and changes the
meaning of the original testimony. Id
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Any assumption that interpreted testimony in our
courtrooms today is largely adequate and accurate is a fiction.
We can continue to accept that fiction in the same way that we
operate on a formal assumption that the poor get the same
level of legal services as the rich, or that race is never a factor
in the courtroom, or we can engage directly with the difficulties
that interpreted testimony presents.
III.

EXCLUSION OF USE OF FOREIGN-LANGUAGE
TESTIMONY AND BILINGUAL JURORS

Given the growing need for language interpretation in
our courtrooms, and the structural problems that it presents,
what steps can we take to improve accuracy and fairness? An
immense amount of additional effort and revenue must be
devoted to training, certifying, and employing interpreters in
courtrooms at every level." We should also step back and
reconsider the wisdom of our current, limited view of the
relevant evidentiary record. Limiting judicial recognition to
interpreted English testimony, completely disregarding the
original foreign-language testimony, irrationally hampers
truth-seeking. It disqualifies bilingual jurors who might best
understand both the evidence and the cultural norms of the
witnesses and parties.
Professor Norbert Kerr and his colleagues, when faced
with potential juror subversion in another context, succinctly
framed our range of remedies as "between greater candor or
thicker blindfolds."3 7 I vote for candor, but let us start with the
blindfolds. Consider three methods of managing a bilingual
3GIn addition to the growing number of court-sponsored self-studies, see, e.g.,
Oregon Report, supra note 7; D.C. Circuit Task Force, supra note 22, many
professionals and commentators have explored the need for constitutional and/or
statutory rights to competent certified interpreters, and have made useful suggestions
in this regard. See Baker, supra note 20; Charles M. Grabau & David-Ross Williamson,
Language Barriers in Our Trial Courts: The Use of Court Interpreters in
Massachusetts, 70 MASS. L. REV. 108 (1985); Deborah M. Weissman, Between
Principlesand Practice:The Need for Certified Court Interpretersin North Carolina,78
N.C. L. REV. 1899 (2000). See also Ileana Dominguez-Urban, The Messenger as the
Medium of Communication: The Use of Interpretersin Mediation, 1997 J. Disp. RESOL.
1 (1997).

Irwin A. Horowitz, Norbert L. Kerr & Keith E. Neidermeier, Jury
Nullification:Legal and PsychologicalPerspectives, 66 BROOK L. REv. 1207 (2001).
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juror in a trial in which testimony will be presented in a nonEnglish language that the juror understands: (1) the current
system endorsed by Hernandez, that allows the juror to be
struck for fear that he will not disregard the original foreign
language testimony; (2) a system that seats bilingual jurors,
but more rigorously screens them from the original language
testimony; or (3) a system that not only accepts bilingual jurors
for service, but allows each juror to fully consider all original
and interpreted evidence to the fullest extent of his ability.
A

The CurrentSystem

The Hernandez Court accepted the peremptory strike
of a bilingual juror whom the lawyer suspected was unwilling
or unable to be faithful solely to the English interpretation as
compared to the original foreign language testimony, finding
the lawyer's reason "correspond [ed] to a valid for-cause
challenge."" This reasoning was predicated on the Court's
acceptance, without question, of the practice of entirely
supplanting original foreign language testimony with English
interpretations. This practice is in tension with ordinary
evidentiary principles, and inhibits the courts' ability to
uncover the truth.
Courts routinely instruct all jurors to disregard nonEnglish testimony and to attend only to the English
interpreter.3 9 Some courts appear doubtful about the efficacy of
their instructions in this regard. For example, in justifying the
strikes of bilingual jurors in Pemberthy v. Beyer, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit argued:
3" Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 362-63.
3' See, e.g., Diaz v. Delaware, 743 A.2d 1166, 1175 (Del. 1998), holding that in
trials involving foreign language testimony and English translation, when one or more
jurors are bilingual, Delaware judges should give instructions similar to the following
federal model:
"Languages other than English may be used during this trial. The
evidence you are to consider is only that provided through the official
court (interpreters) (translators). Although some of you may know the
non-English language used, it is important that all jurors consider the
same evidence. Therefore, you must base your decision on the evidence
presented in English (interpretation) (translation). You must
disregard any different meaning of the non-English words."
Id. at 1175 (citing MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 9 Circuit §§ 1.12, 3.18).
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[Tihe following mental experiment is instructive. Readers whose
primary language is English should imagine that they are also
proficient in another language and that they are serving on a jury in
a jurisdiction in which that other language is spoken. Readers
should also imagine that some of the evidence in the trial is in
English, that this evidence is translated into the native language of
the jurisdiction, and that the translation of some key passages
seems, based on the readers' knowledge of English, to be clearly
wrong. Readers should then ask whether they could say without
reservation that they could render a verdict based on the apparently
erroneous translation provided in court-even if it seemed to them
that a correct translation would dictate a contrary verdict. We
suspect that many readers would find it difficult to say that under
these circumstances they could unhesitatingly follow the translation
offered in court.40

The court was quite likely right. Indeed, in the Hernandez case
itself, petitioner and his amici pointed to authority that
bilingual jurors "necessarily receive two inputs," one from the
original language testimony and the other from the Englishlanguage interpretation, making it impossible to shut out the
original testimony.4' If, indeed, it is inherently impossible for a
bilingual juror to comply with instructions to ignore the foreign
language testimony, then courts could uniformly strike all
bilingual jurors under current case law.
A more interesting question than whether a bilingual
juror could listen only to English testimony is whether the
system should so limit her. If we adopt the fiction that an
interpretation is an exact translation, then exclusion of
bilingual jurors is unjustified, because listening to original
foreign-language testimony would be exactly the same as only
hearing its English interpretation. If we accept the reality that

40 19 F.3d 857, 867 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 969 (1994).
41 Petitioner's Reply Brief at 8, Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991)

(No. 89-7645), available at 1991 WL 538726 (citing to BERK-SELIGSON, supra note 33,
at 167-68 (1990); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Jackson v. Denno, 378
U.S. 368, 388-89 (1964)); see also Brief of Amici Curiae Mexican American Legal
Defense and Educational Fund et al. in Support of Petitioner at 13, Hernandez v. New
York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (No. 89-7645) ("There is no evidence that bilingual
individuals of any type have the ability to switch off one of their language systems.")
[hereinafter MALDEF Brief].
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all interpretation introduces differences, then the threshold
question should be which version(s) of the testimony should be
considered.
Application of the principles animating both hearsay
and the best evidence rules 42 would suggest that original
language testimony is the superior, if not the only acceptable
source, over any interpretation or transcription. Compare cases
in which sound recordings of conversations, such as wiretaps,
are placed before the jury. The recording itself is introduced
into evidence and played for the jury; written transcripts of the
tape are usually allowed only as aids for the listening jurors,
within the discretion of the trial judge.43 Similarly, we presume
testimony by a witness who only heard of an out-of-court
interpreter's rendition of a person's statement in a language
foreign to the witness is inadmissible hearsay.44
Of course, interpretations of in-court testimony by
court interpreters are not hearsay because both the original
witness and the interpreter are in court, sworn, and the
42 See FED. R. EVID. 801-02; FED. R. EVID. 1002. Of course, the misleadingly

named "best evidence rule" does not apply to spoken words, only a narrow category of
writings, recordings, and photographs. Id.
43 See, e.g., United States v. John, 508 F.2d 1134 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 962 (1975). The court emphasized the safeguards that allowed transcripts to be
shown to the juryBefore distributing the transcripts, the court carefully instructed the
jury on their limited use. It directed the jury to use the transcripts
only as aids in listening to the recordings and to base its verdict upon
what was heard and not upon what was read. Further, the jurors were
directed to listen carefully to the declarant's manner and emphasis of
speech so as to understand the meaning of what was said. Finally, the
transcripts were not made available to the jury during its deliberation.
Id. at 1141; see also Duggan v. State, 189 So.2d 890 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (finding
that written transcripts prepared by court reporter of tape recordings of conversations
of defendant were inadmissible under best evidence rule since tape recordings
themselves were best evidence, and under hearsay rule where reporter was not present
when recordings were made); Daniel E. Feld, Annotation, Admissibility in Evidence of
Sound Recording as Affected by Hearsay and Best Evidence Rules, 58 A.L.R.3d 598, § 7
(1974 & Supp. 2000).
44 See, e.g., Green v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 333 F. Supp. 1398 (E.D. Pa.
1971), affd, Green v. Parisi, 478 F.2d 313 (3d Cir. 1973) (stating that testimony
regarding conversation interpreted outside of court was inadmissible hearsay); see also
State v. Fong Loon, 158 P. 233, 237 (Idaho 1916) (holding that witness has no personal
knowledge and thus is not qualified to testify about statements of another person
spoken in a foreign language and translated into the witnesses' language by an
interpreter).
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witness is subject to cross examination.45 These usual
safeguards of reliability are, however, disabled if all factfinders are instructed to accept only the interpreters' testimony
without reference to the utterances of the witnesses
themselves. Ultimately, the choice of interpreted English over
the foreign-language testimony cannot be justified on grounds
that it is superior evidence, but is better explained as a product
of our justice system's fundamental discomfort with
accommodating non-English speakers. While a critique of the
hegemony of the English language and cultural majorities is
beyond the scope of this discussion,46 it is informative to
consider why current courtroom practice suppresses so heavily
non-English evidence.
Non-English testimony cannot be excluded on the
grounds that it is inaccurate. It is not inherently
untrustworthy, or inappropriate for the jury to hear, such as a
coerced confession ruled inadmissible on a motion in limine. It
is not, or at least cannot be constitutionally attacked as being,
uniformly indicative of bias or prejudice by a bilingual speaker
toward the specific parties or events of a specific case.4"
Regardless of their language ability, jurors with particular
knowledge of the case itself or with professed partiality to a
45Fong Loon, 158 P. at 237.
46 See Leslie V. Dery, Disinterring the "Good" and the "Bad Immigrant"
A

Deconstruction of the State Court InterpreterLaws for Non-English Speaking Criminal
Defendants, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 837, 850-51 (1997) ("Immediately below this surface
layer of language as the instrument of socialization, lies ... the related theme that
English language dominance in the United States evinces a pervasive and pertinacious
nativism among native English speakers directed against non-English speakers.");
Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C.
L. REV. 303, 305, 311-15, 351-58 (1986) ("Cultural majorities have sought to force
outsiders to conform to the prevailing cultural norms; alternatively, they have sought
to dominate and suppress the outsiders, separating them from the public life of the
community."); Martha Minow, Stripped Down Like a Runner or Enriched by
Experience: Bias and Impartialityof Judges and Jurors,33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1201,
1212 (1992) ("The present Court has moved away from recognizing language, ethnic,
and racial differences as important dimensions of American life and dimensions to be
integrated throughout our institutions. Instead, the Court seems to fear differences
and to desire to exclude those people it fears.").
47 See Pemberthy, 19 F.3d at 872:
[A] prosecutor cannot strike Spanish-speaking jurors based on a
statistical study showing that Spanish-speaking jurors are more likely
[that] would have little
to be sympathetic to X type of defendants ....
to do with the fact that the jurors spoke Spanish and a lot to do with
the fact that most Spanish-speaking jurors are Latino.
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particular party or position may always be challenged for cause
under traditional voir dire practice.
At worst, accepting jurors with original language
understanding might trouble the genuinely race-neutral
litigator with the specter of creating a "one-man jury." Among
the traditional uses of peremptory strikes is the targeting of
jurors with special expertise who are likely to have "an
inordinate amount of influence on fellow jurors who are likely
to respect his authority," such as doctors in cases with medical
issues. 8 However, what little data we have about this
phenomenon suggests that bilingual jurors would not assume
this role by virtue of mere language comprehension, as opposed
to expertise relevant to the substantive content of disputed
issues. In addition, the most persuasive figures on juries have
"foreman-like" personalities, higher status occupations and
incomes, and greater educational experience. 9 While we need
empirical research to understand how monolingual and
bilingual jurors interact, any risk of "one-man juries" is too
speculative to justify exclusion.
Finally, courts may be concerned about the
administrability and disorder of a proceeding that accounts for
original language testimony. But, as explained in the third
option, broader acceptance of this testimony should not require
more resources than properly accommodating non-English
speakers' testimony already requires of our courts. Ultimately,
non-English testimony is excluded because it is opaque, even
uncomfortable, to an English-only speaking majority.
B.

ScreeningBilingual JurorsFromNon-English
Testimony

One response to concerns about bilingual jurors who
might be conflicted between original and interpreted testimony
is to remove mechanically the source of the conflict. Justice
Stevens dissented in Hernandez in part because he rejected the
prosecutor's claim that a peremptory strike was the only
solution to bilingual jurors who could not close their ears to
48 See FRED LANE, 1 GOLDSTEIN TRIAL TECHNIQUE § 9.55 (3d ed. 1984).
4' Id.; see also JEFFREY T. FREDERICK, MASTERING VOIR DIRE AND JURY
SELECTION: GAINING AN EDGE IN QUESTIONING AND SELECTING A JURY 153 (1995).
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original language testimony. Accepting the assumption of the
supremacy of the English interpretation, Justice Stevens
nonetheless found that "the prosecutor's concern could easily
have been accommodated by less drastic means," including
more rigorous and detailed jury instructions or confining what
all jurors heard to a simultaneous English language
interpretation, so no juror would ever hear the non-English
testimony."
Jury instructions could go beyond rigid admonitions to
jurors to heed only the interpreted testimony and to refrain
from discussing any doubts they have about the interpreted
testimony so as not to unduly influence other jurors. An "even
more effective" alternative to jury instructions, Justice Stevens
suggests, is to mechanically remove the source of the
temptation, that is, to mask any access to the original language
testimony." Technology and techniques borrowed from
arrangements for other special testimony, such as that of child
witnesses, could be adapted to mute the original language
testimony from all jurors." These could include videotaping,
closed circuit television broadcasts from an adjacent room,
special microphone designs, or even putting headphones onto
all jurors so only the interpreted testimony is audible.5 3
I agree with Justice Stevens that bilingual jurors will
not undermine courtroom proceedings, and that practical and
constitutional concerns dictate their accommodation. These
methods of accommodating bilingual jurors are at least far less
intrusive than striking them from service altogether. However,
further distancing jurors from the original language testimony
moves in the opposite direction from the best solution. In this
case, less is not more. Instead of such intermediate measures,
we should step back and reframe our valuation of the original
language testimony itself, and fully embrace it.

Hernandez,500 U.S. at 379 & n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
5 Id.
12 See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 840-42 (1990) (allowing child
witnesses to testify outside of defendant's presence via one-way closed circuit
television).
See Justin B. Denton, ProtectingBoth Ethnic Minorities and the Equal
Protection Clause: The Dilemma of Language-Based Peremptory Challenges, 1997
B.Y.U. L. REV. 101, 127-29 (advocating technical procedural solutions to accommodate
bilingual jurors).
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Allowing All Jurorsto Fully Considerthe Originaland
InterpretedTestimony

My proposal is to acknowledge both original foreign
language testimony and its English interpretation, allow all
jurors to consider both, and preserve both for the record. At
least part of this policy can be immediately implemented by
judges in their individual discretion over their courtroom
proceedings; system-wide procedures could be fairly simply
incorporated into administrative practices under current
statutes. While Hernandez itself might remain on the books,
the "race-neutral" reason for striking bilingual jurors would be
mooted by the change in definition of what constitutes
acceptable evidence. This change will enhance the truthseeking function of the proceedings, give jurors the full respect
and power due their office, and bypass the constitutional
thicket of racial discrimination that every strike of a bilingual
juror must now attempt to skirt.
This approach is modest, akin to allowing jurors in allEnglish proceedings to consider audio recordings as well as
supplemental or sound-enhanced written transcriptions to aid
their comprehension."
Any ambiguity introduced by
consideration of the original version of the testimony is
consistent with the ambiguity that we tolerate every day in allEnglish proceedings. Original English language testimony is
given by witnesses and six to twelve jurors all hear it directly,
but often differently. Each juror might miss a phrase,
misunderstand an accent, fail to recognize slang, hear different
emphasis, pick up on sarcasm, or get distracted by physical
cues. Each might come away with a different impression of not
just a witness, but the content of what that witness said, and
the memories of each may change over time, particularly when
unaided by notes. Thus, the understanding of each juror may
differ from another's and, indeed, from what the court reporter
recorded for the official transcript. We do not insist that jurors
ignore English testimony as they heard it, in favor of a single
" See Feld, supranote 43. Just as the parties and the court must be satisfied
as to the accuracy and reliability of the transcription in all-English audio-to-written
translations, there must be guarantees of the skills and accuracy of sworn interpreters
when language translations are introduced.
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official version; nor do reporters read back each word as
recorded, so jurors can supplant their memories with the
recorded version.
Current practices can be extended to create a record
for review in cases involving non-English testimony. Rather
than using technology to reduce the amount of information
given to the jury, as suggested by proponents of screening
access to the foreign language testimony, technology could be
employed to enhance the record. Federal law already requires
that, on agreement of the parties in civil proceedings, all
proceedings "shall be recorded verbatim by shorthand,
mechanical means, electronic sound recording, or any other
method," subject to Judicial Conference regulations
"prescrib[ing] the types of electronic sound recording" or other
means that may be used.5 A uniform requirement that nonEnglish testimony be recorded, and those tapes certified and
preserved in case of a dispute, would at least allow for review
in cases in which the accuracy or fairness of an interpreter
might be material to the outcome of the proceedings.
As in the current system, parties would bring disputes
over alleged omissions or misinterpretations in the record first
to the district court for conclusive resolution, although the
circuit court would continue to retain authority to correct
errors in the record or to remand for correction.56 Allowing
challenges to interpreted testimony would allow review of
matters currently not, as a practical matter, susceptible to
review. This additional burden; like the already accepted
encumbrance of requiring interpretation services at all, is a
necessary cost of meaningfully accommodating non-English
speakers and attempting to understand the facts.57
5528 U.S.C.

§ 753(b) (2000). In criminal cases, the creation of a transcript is
mandatory unless the proceedings have been recorded by electronic sound recordings
certified and filed with the clerk. JAMES W. MOORE, 12 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §
310.20 (3d ed. 2000) (Court Reporter's Duties).
"SFED. R. APP. PROC. 10(e); see also MOORE, supra note 55, at § 310.40
(Authority to Settle Disputes Concerning Record).
57 Although the requirement of meaningful access under the Constitution's
due process guarantee could arguably encompass such record-keeping as an incident to
fair proceedings, it is unclear that such rights would extend to review. Cf M.L.B. v.
S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (conditioning review of parental termination on ability to
pay transcript fees violates Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses). It is difficult to
predict the number of collateral proceedings that would be brought to challenge
interpretations. Most errors would be challenged contemporaneously, and practical
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compelling
provides
approach
inclusive
This
advantages over alternative methods of coping with nonEnglish testimony. It embraces all witnesses' direct and
original testimony, rather than irrationally discarding nonEnglish statements as meaningless. Typically, translation of
witness testimony is sequential. By instructing all jurors to
concentrate on both the original and interpreted testimony,
they remain more continuously engaged. They will also
consider the totality of testimony, allowing them to more fully
consider the demeanor and non-verbal expressions of witnesses
in order to make those fundamental credibility determinations
discussed by Shari Seidman Diamond in this symposium."
Inclusion is a marked advantage over approaches that attempt
to direct the jurors' attention away from the non-English
speaking witness. By privileging neither the foreign language
nor English versions, each juror may consider everything that
helps her best understand the testimony.
Bilingual jurors who can listen to the original
testimony and assist the court if the interpreter falls short will
improve the chances that errors will come to the court's
attention for a quick and timely clarification. Jury instructions
and the experiences of lower courts that do allow bilingual
jurors to sit are instructive. For example, one court instructed
a multilingual panel:
The Court recognizes that some of the jurors may be able to
understand Spanish, and your own ears will tell you what you hear.
This witness is testifying through an interpreter, but if those of you
who can in fact understand Spanish hear certain words differently
tha[n] you understand the interpreter to relate them, then you may,
when the witness is finished with his testimony, you may place your
question, you may raise the question that you have with the Court.
If the Court feels that it is a question that can be properly answered,
59
then the Court will take care of attempting to get it answered.

constraints on parties' resources likely would winnow subsequent challenges to the
record to the grossest errors.
Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66
BROOK. L. REV. 1121 (2001).
r9 United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654, 662-63 (9th Cir. 1981) (using
instructions to jury that included bilingual jurors). While the plurality of the
Hernandez Court characterized the juror dispute later raised in this case as a
"problemf," 500 U.S. at 360 n.3, Justice Stevens cited it with approval as an example
of how jurors could follow instructions and bring disputes to the court for resolution.
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Introducing accountability increases the incentives of
the court and interpreters to provide accurate services and
encourages resources that are already being devoted to
interpretation services to be utilized most effectively. These
gains in accuracy and fairness also reduce any burden of
allowing review of dual testimony.
In addition to accuracy, another important reason to
implement this policy is to allow jurors to realize their full
value in the courtroom. As Akhil Amar has commented, jurors
represent themselves and the people; they should not be mere
expressions of the parties' rights, subject to the arbitrary or
disparate use of peremptory strikes. ° If we conceive of the jury
system as an incident to universal suffrage and as a political
institution in its own right, then we must strive for inclusion,
allowing all jurors to sit free from discrimination not just on
the basis of race, ethnicity, or sex, but also free from exclusions
for possessing knowledge short of specific personal knowledge
of the controversy or individual bias. 61 The facial argument for
exclusion of bilingual jurors in the current system is not based
on fear of improper bias, but on the risk that a juror will not
comply with irrational instructions. Thus, regardless where we
ultimately draw the line for appropriate strikes for bias, 2
jurors with bilingual skills (not otherwise personally biased)
should rationally fall into the category of people who are
seated; they can bring skills and perception to the fact-finding
process. Exercise of these skills is no different from what we

Id. at 379.
'0 See also Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28
U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 1169, 1182 (1995) ("Juries should represent the people, not the
parties."); Vikram D. Amar, Jury Service as PoliticalParticipation,Akin to Voting, 80
CORNELL L. REv. 203 (1995) (arguing that jury service is a political right).
61 Of course, if voir dire revealed such individual biases, these individuals
would remain subject to strikes for cause upon the lawyer's articulation of such reasons
on the record.
62 Compare Akhil Amar, supra note 60, at 1182-83 (advocating
elimination of
the peremptory challenge), with Shari Seidman Diamond, et al., Juries:Arbiters or
Arbitrary?: Redefining the Role of the Jury: Realistic Responses to the Limitations of
Batson v. Kentucky, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'y 77, 83-95 (1997) (arguing that
empirical data support a system of extensive voir dire combined with preemptory
challenges to create more "impartial" juries), and Deborah A. Ramirez, The Mixed Jury
and the Ancient Custom of Trial by Jury de Medietate Linguae: A History and A
Proposal for Change, 74 B.U. L. REV. 777, 806-18 (1994) (proposing a system of
affirmative peremptory challenges for inclusion of diverse jurors).
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ask English-speaking jurors to do each day, namely to consider
nuances of language and idiom and behavior, judge credibility,
and bring common sense and a knowledge of the world
rationally to bear on decision making. In turn, these jurors can
add to the educative experience of jury service and share in its
power.
The full range and richness of what bilingual citizens
can bring to juries need not be quantified exactly. In the most
mechanical sense, they bring immediate technical skills to
assist our courts through the growing pains of adapting to
increasing multilingual demands. Although there is no exact
congruence of language and ethnicity or culture, the
disproportionate correlation of bilingualism and protected
classes means, as a practical matter, that inclusion would
bring a potential for greater diversity to juries." This inclusion
of voices, in turn, can alter the decision-making process in
subtle ways that need not necessarily correlate with particular
points of view.' Finally, this inclusion combats the often
invisible systems of privileging the viewpoints and voices of

As the Court knew when it decided Hernandez, most Hispanics in the
United States are Spanish-speaking. MALDEF Brief, supra note 41, at 3, 8-9 ("97% of
individuals who usually speak Spanish are Hispanic; 72% of all Hispanics claim some
level of knowledge of Spanish; and 64% of all Hispanics report being bilingual."). The
Fifth Circuit was quite blunt about this correlation, "It may be that in certain, or even
most, situations in Texas striking [based on Spanish-speaking ability] would be the
equivalent of or a pretext for prohibited striking for ethnicity." United States v. Munoz,
15 F.3d 395, 399 (5th Cir. 1994).
" The empirical work of scholars such as those present at "The Jury in the
Twenty-First Century" symposium indicates the very real effects of racial/ethnic
diversity on juries. See generally Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Quotas and the Jury, 44
DUKE L.J. 704 (1995); Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination:
Measuring the Effects of JurorRace on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63 (1993). In
any event, the interplay of race, ethnicity, and viewpoint need not be correlated exactly
to be acknowledged by our courts. Cf Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547,
579 (1990):
The judgment that there is a link between expanded minority
ownership and broadcast diversity does not rest on impermissible
The predictive judgment about the overall result of
stereotyping ....
minority entry into broadcasting is not a rigid assumption about how
minority owners will behave in every case but rather is akin to Justice
Powell's conclusion in Bakke that greater admission of minorities
would contribute, on average, to the "robust exchange of ideas."
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racial and language majorities and strengthens the legitimacy
of the institution of the jury."
With these suggestions in mind, here is the start of my
research wish list; please heed the urgings of "The Jury in the
Twenty-First Century" symposium organizers and add your
suggestions. We need to know more about:
*

The current and forecast language needs of
courts and their players.

*

The pitfalls of interpreting particular ideas or
vocabulary, particularly legal concepts, in
specific languages.6 6

*

Interpreters and how to effectively train them for
both sequential and simultaneous interpretation
in courtroom settings.

*

Whether

current training

addresses

needed

skills.
*

Whether current testing
measures needed skills.

*

How to measure the accuracy of interpretations.
Methods for systematically auditing courtroom
interpreters should address both gaps in the
quantity of coverage and alterations in the
quality or meaning of interpretations.

and

certification

See Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (denying
disqualification of a female judge from a Title VII sex-discrimination case on the basis
of bias, noting that under defendant's reasoning no judge could hear a discrimination
case, as all judges have a sex and a race); accord Minow, supra note 46, at 1207 (a
different view of bias and impartiality exposes "the assumption that the neutral
baseline against which to evaluate bias is the vantage point of a white male"). On the
benefits of diversity on juries see, e.g., Kim Forde-Mazrui, JuralDistricting:Selecting
ImpartialJuries Through Community Representation, 52 VAND. L. REv. 353, 360-65
(1999) (arguing that representativeness improves the quality of decision making,
enhances the political legitimacy of juries as a democratically inclusive institution, and
educates jurors about civic participation).
See, e.g., the Hmong word for "rape," Hammond, supra note 28.
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"

How bilingual jurors process and comprehend
simultaneous and sequential testimony in two
languages.

*

What communicative aspects of testimony jurors
gain from hearing and observing live testimony,
even if they cannot comprehend the language
used.

*

How frequently, and in what ways, Englishspeaking jurors differ from each other and from
the court reporter's transcript in understanding
English-language testimony.

*

Whether bilingual jurors are likely to dominate
in deliberations if non-English testimony is
presented.

*

Whether jurors will heed instructions regarding
disagreement or clarification of testimony, or
discussion of interpretations with fellow jurors.
Do instructions work?

*

Whether and how bilingualism in various
languages might overlap or correlate with
race/ethnicity and cultural perspective.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I want to underscore the point several
symposium participants have made: the jury has lost power in
recent years. That loss is particularly significant for minority
jurors and defendants who have only recently won the formal
right to participate in our justice system free from
discrimination. It is ironic that Latino/as were recognized as an
ethnic minority under the Fourteenth Amendment in 1954
when the practice of barring Mexican Americans from jury
service was struck down in the case of Hernandez v. Texas.'
(; Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (holding that persons of Mexican
descent were a separate class distinct from whites in the community in question, and
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Less than four decades later, in the 1991 Hernandez case, the
same Court told these very same people, having won the right
to sit on juries, that they now knew too much to serve.68 This
exclusionary policy reduces the resources of our justice system
by excluding precisely those most able to address the growing
needs of our multilingual courts. The "Jury of the Twenty-First
Century" must face demographic realities, and reflect the
richness of our present and future multilingual society.

that there had been a systematic exclusion of Mexican Americans from jury service in
violation of the Constitution).
68 The pendulum has swung back in many aspects ofjury service and political
participation. See, e.g., Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations,113
HARv. L. REV. 1261, 1276-95 (2000) (stating that non-unanimous jury decision making
in criminal trials could jeopardize the victories that historically excluded groups have
won in cases challenging barriers to jury service).

